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DRONES: PROPOSED STANDARDS OF LIABILITY 
Kristopher-Kent ‘K-K’ Harris 
The law often incorrectly uses the term drone, therefore a more 
exact definition is needed. As defined by specialists in the applicable 
technological field, the term drone generally means any algorithm that 
carries out an action following a command or commands. This includes 
commands programmed in advance and real-time commands. A drone 
has limited autonomous decision-making abilities and is therefore 
always subject to its master, master controller, or operator.  Drones 
are not capable of truly autonomous artificial intelligence.  
Accordingly, this Article will argue that strict liability rather than 
negligence is the most appropriate legal standard for assessing the 
liability of manufacturers, distributors, designers, and users of drones 
for injury caused by a drone. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
The term drone generally means any algorithm that carries out 
an action following a command or commands.1  This includes 
commands programmed in advance and real-time commands.  This 
proposal puts forth suggestions about drone liability with the specific 
involvement of a master,2  master controller,3  operator, or bystander 
through American tort law.  Drone liability can be strenuous for 
courts to consider, especially if the courts cannot determine the actor 
at fault. This Article advocates that courts adopt a strict liability 
approach to apportion drone liability under The Restatement (Second) 
of Torts and The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability. This 
proposal unravels the complexities of drone liability by unmasking 
the true master of the drone. 
I. DRONE LIABILITY HIERARCHY 
A. Proposed Strict Liability 
This Article will argue that the appropriate guiding doctrine for 
drone liability is strict or absolute liability.4 The makers, sellers, or 
designers of drone products have rushed to the market, without 
conducting the preliminary safety tests that modern American law has 
advised for in new technologies.5  Manufacturing defects are often 
responsible for injuries. 6  However, drone sellers are not liable for 
                                                          
1 Memorandum from Reginald C. Govan, Chief Counsel, FAA, to Earl Lawrence, Director, 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration Office (May 4, 2016), 2016 WL 2851144, (addressing 
educational use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)); Alex Alben, WASH. OFF. OF PRIVACY & 
DATA PROTECTION, WASHINGTON STATE POLICY GUIDELINES FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT 
SYSTEMS (2016), http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/NR/rdonlyres/AC738BE5-FDCE-4FD9-A173-
6C913FDABE24/0/DronePolicyGuidelines.pdf (last visited June 12, 2017). 
2 Master, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018). 
3 Master Controller, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018). 
4 Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
5 See BRUNO SICILIANO, ET. AL., SPRINGER HANDBOOK OF ROBOTICS, 1522 (Bruno Siciliano & 
Oussama Khatib eds., 2nd ed. 2016). 
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1965); See RESTATEMENT 
THIRD OF TORTS § 2(a) (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
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design or warning instruction faults or for accident or safety costs.7 
Thus, under current tort law standards, injured victims cannot be 
effectively compensated by the sellers, if said sellers have modified or 
rebranded the drone. If the court were to apply a strict liability rule to 
this issue, this approach would then serve as an effective test of 
responsibility.   
The law also requires the application of a test that specifically 
considers abnormally dangerous activities. 8   Judges will enforce 
liability without fault when explosives cause harm, even if they are 
properly handled. 9  When a defendant has been held under a strict 
liability standard, neither negligence nor intent must be proven.10 This 
principle is ideally suited to drones and strict liability. By definition, a 
drone is incapable of acting on its own volition. If a drone performs an 
action, it is merely obeying a previous command input. Any resulting 
harm is the responsibility of the master controller who, as an operator, 
gave the drone that command without first ascertaining that the 
command could be safely performed by the drone under his or her 
operation.  In fact, a recent Seattle court decision has proven that, in 
the case of a physical injury inflicted by a drone, the master operator 
was properly held to a strict liability standard.11,12   
The court would be wrong to attribute blame to the drone, even in 
the case of artificial intelligence, since any drone is a mere functionary 
of some form of command input and the drone is incapable of acting 
on its own volition. Many cases arise where the plaintiff suffers 
personal harm at the hands of an employee, but seeks to impose liability 
on the employer.  In these cases, the employer often contends that the 
employee caused the harm in a way that fell outside that employee’s 
assigned responsibilities or that the employee otherwise fell short of 
the practices which they have been trained to follow. In fact, drones 
will, or at least are intended to, follow the will of their operator as well 
as their master programmer, service provider, or programmer. Strict 
liability provides a definite legal resolution to such matters.  
Next, this article explores certain technologies where courts have 
applied strict liability, when such technologies have injured an 
individual. This article will identify the factors that courts have found 
                                                          
7 See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 6.2 (2d ed. 2008). 
8 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377, Instructions No. at 5-9 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12, 2017); 
& Verdict Form, (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017) (finding the defendant guilty of reckless 
endangerment); SEATTLE, WA. WASH., CRIM. CODE § 12A.06.050 (1973). 
12 See discussion infra Section I.C. (for clarification on determining onto whom liability falls.) 
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to be significant for determining when to apply strict liability.13 Under 
tort law, strict liability results from liability for all defective product 
distributors.14 First, fault falls on the product distributor when one’s 
product design is defective and then the law applies the use of a cost-
benefit approach test.15 If a product defect causes injury, the selling 
business or product’s distributor is held to strict liability for that injury. 
Consequently, distributors are held to a strict liability standard for 
manufacturing product defects.16 In this manner, the possible result of 
bodily harm is made into a concern for the seller, while the injured 
individual finds a suitable party to compensate for the defect.17  
Furthermore, drone sellers who have rebranded or modified a 
drone after manufacturing can and should be strictly liable. This same 
attribution of strict liability would still apply in cases where true fault 
lies with the manufacturer. If a manufacturer of a delivered drone, for 
example, did not include the proper safety materials needed for 
protecting the drone’s battery and caused an explosion, then the 
manufacturer transgressed upon the basic expectation that the drone 
should be safe to use in its surrounding environment. The 
manufacturer, who should have reduced the drone’s likelihood of 
injuring operators, would therefore be negligent.18 While sellers of the 
drones at the wholesaler and retailer levels are not at fault, they are 
equally as legally liable as those manufactures of a defective product. 
The law holds that manufacturers are strictly liable for the products 
which they sell. Therefore, all manufacturing defects present in any 
drone (as in any manufactured product) are held to a strict liability 
standard by all distributors. This practice is a form of corrective 
justice;19 it provides compensation to the injured person, yet enforces a 
liability on all distributors. Further, a distributor who claims no 
fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation of their product is still liable 
for any injury inflicted by that misrepresentation, even if the 
misrepresentation did not result in negligence or in fault.20  Similar 
liability is enforced upon the manufacturer against defects or due to 
misrepresentation.21 
                                                          
13 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
14 See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
15 Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000). (“Bombardier” failed to warn the 
dangers of the watercraft). 
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
19 Corrective Justice, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
21 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
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In like manner, this article will consider instances where strict 
liability has been applied to occurrences in which a defendant, through 
high-energy activities, has caused physical harm to a plaintiff. An 
Indianapolis judge ruled that Sony “notebook/laptop” batteries which 
had caused fires or even explosions were unreasonably defective.22  
Hewlett-Packard sought negligence relief in the form of monetary 
compensation for its status as the seller of these Sony batteries. So, to 
escape Indiana’s products liability statute, Hewlett-Packard carried out 
several forensic tests to prove the fault lay with Sony Energy and Sony 
Taiwan manufacturing.23 Judges may conclude that liability must be 
based on easily-determined fault, but it is not so simple for said judges 
to reach this determination if the activity is considered common.24  It is 
the right of each state to determine which strict liability tests and rules 
its judges enforce. 25  Even if the machine in question might be 
dangerous, it should be possible to handle or use the device with an 
expectation of reasonable safety, thus minimizing strict liability. 26 
Therefore, future drone laws should enforce strict liability on 
abnormally dangerous activities, when calculated against deterrents in 
future holdings.  
Customarily, the court commonly holds that enforcing strict 
liability will reduce harm by encouraging an industry to reduce 
abnormally dangerous activities, to discover new avenues to achieve 
the same desired results, or to encourage these activities to be 
conducted in a controlled environment.27  It is not clear whether strict 
liability deters risk;28  however, in order to allow drones to be used to 
advance our society, we cannot dismiss the fact that risk reduction 
would be logically preferable.  Naturally, drone activities such as 
controlling a drone in a construction site or sending a bot into a highly 
                                                          
22  Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 1:10-cv-01124-JMS-DML, 2011 WL 
4550155 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2011). 
23 Id. 
24 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 32.6 (2d ed. 
2016) (citing Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533 (Wis. 1997)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.6 (citing G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 54 F.3d 379, 
386 (7th Cir. 1995) (The popular quote from Posner, C.J.: “…“ . . . the tiger, is that the abnormally 
hazardous activity is conceived of as the sale of the thing that makes the activity hazardous, rather 
than as the activity itself. It is as if it were fine to keep the tiger in your backyard but if you sell it 
to someone else to put in his backyard and the tiger claws him, you are strictly liable for the injury. 
We cannot find any precedent, or any basis in common sense, for such a theory of strict liability. 
Of course there is also strict liability for the sale of a dangerous or defective product…”)). 
28 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.6 (citing Joseph H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach 
to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 353–54 
(1996)). 
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hazardous condition can be productive.29  Although there is always a 
question of negligence when considering the use of drones for 
recreational purposes, some non-recreational activities involving 
drones cannot be confined to safety zones. For example, this is true if 
such devices are needed in a construction site to reduce human injuries. 
The activity may be uncommon or unnatural, but we cannot put too 
many deterrents on drone activities, especially if reducing risks is the 
ultimate desired outcome. 
Distributing risk at an enterprise level undoubtedly necessitates a 
different course of action. Society is under the impression that a 
corporation itself could not be at fault and that an individual overseeing 
the corporation is at fault. However, under the influence of the law, 
enterprising business ventures in the drone technology field typically 
should display a good-faith effort by allowing their products to undergo 
rigorous testing. Currently, society still believes that enterprise backing 
of a liability claim equates to that enterprise becoming a good-risk 
distributor for its sellers. 30  Most individual inventors cannot be 
burdened with protecting themselves from lawsuits, 31  while an 
enterprise is more than willing to absorb the costs of cost-benefit 
analytics. Similarly, individuals who are harmed by drone technology 
might be less likely to file for non-negligent harm.  
Following this logic, questions regarding enterprise liability are 
not simply restricted to cost-benefit analyses or determinations of the 
responsible corporate individual. Each affected community’s concepts 
of fairness or justice decide if an individual or a business should bear 
the costs of strict liability, even if the business or individual inventor 
did not contribute to the cause at hand.32  If an inventor or enterprise 
carries out an activity negligently, but in an otherwise perfectly normal 
way per his or her community’s expectations, then strict liability may 
not be enforced as heavily as it would be in a community which regards 
the activities as more high-risk or unique to the situation. 33   New 
technologies, like drone technology, should therefore proceed 
according to strict liability, rather than the law of negligence. 
Presently, the primary issue in apportioning liability among those 
who have designed, made, supplied, or operated a drone seems to be 
the identification of the particular command inputs which led to the 
                                                          
29 SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1521. 
30  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The 
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1987)). 
31 Marcel v. Becnel, 96-1139 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/27/97), 691 So. 2d 1344, writ denied, 97-1080 
(La. 6/13/97), 695 So. 2d 984 (1997)). 
32 See Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp., 56 Cal. App. 4th 618 (1997). 
33 Leatherwood v. Wadley, 121 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003). 
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injury in question.34 For example, the law might decide that a flying 
drone is not inherently dangerous merely because it flies. Regardless, 
the law might also judge, for reasons of justice and public policy, that 
liability should be assigned to the person who commanded the drone to 
fly so fast that it deprived a small child of his eye.35 In this same 
scenario, we should apportion liability between the drone operator who 
gave the offending command and the manufacturer who originally 
granted the device the capacity to fly at dangerous speeds when 
operated by the end purchaser. 
Yet, as with nearly every endeavor, the most complicated factor 
remains: the human factor. Judges and juries have not properly 
characterized drone activity because they simply cannot comprehend 
the technical aspects of which drones are capable and so are reliant 
upon technical witnesses to provide even a modicum of elucidation.36  
Judges and juries must confront special barriers to the proper 
characterization of drone activity when they seek to decipher drone 
technology. Drone technological advancement would be hindered if the 
courts utilized a uniform approach, as such an approach risks the 
likelihood that an equal footing may then develop between a defendant 
and a plaintiff in regards to activity characterization.  By applying strict 
liability, the court signals that the activity is uncommon and that the 
defendant’s actions are special.37  Depending on its presentation, the 
activity in question might or might not be perceived as abnormally 
dangerous by a particular community. 38   Injuries caused by drone 
activities can be minimized if judges are able to determine if the risk 
stemmed from the defendant or if the plaintiff had any control over 
those risks. 39   High-activity risks should instead be considered as 
inherent risks,40 regardless of who previously interacted with the drone. 
Thus, between the competing principles of tort liability, strict 
liability, and negligence liability, strict liability emerges as the best 
source of guidance for future case law when dealing with the matter of 
liability for drone-caused injuries. However, courts should also 
consider developing a more novel and nuanced approach to liability by 
                                                          
34 See RESTATEMENT THIRD OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
35 Mary-Ann Russon, UK toddler Oscar Webb loses eye in UAV accident, INT’L BUS. TIMES, 
(Dec. 2, 2015 10:18AM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/uk-toddler-oscar-webb-loses-eye-uav-
accident-people-are-problem-not-drones-1531390 
36 § 11:95.Content—Explaining technical matters—Importance in product liability and medical 
malpractice cases, 2 La. Prac. Pers. Inj. § 11:95 
37 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous 
Enterprises, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992)). 
38 Gallagher v. H.V. Pierhomes, LLC, 182 Md. App. 94 (2008). 
39 Id. 
40 Inherent Risk, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).   
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taking into account some of the distinguishing factors developed by 
previous courts when dealing with injuries caused by agents, 
employees, subcontractors, and independent contractors. 
B. Proposed Vicarious Liability 
When the realms of drone technology and vicarious liability 
intersect in a court of law, it is difficult to assign liability between 
individuals and results.  The complexity of the drone’s role in society, 
as both a recreational object and professional asset, only exacerbates 
this dilemma, as does the applicability of a master-servant rule41 for 
drones. Vicarious liability is a tort for another person who is 
accountable for their own legal fault; yet, in the absence of fault, this 
individual is not responsible for other parties under the respondeat 
superior principle.42 This tort principle addresses actions taken within 
the scope of employment by employees who are jointly responsible for 
said actions along with their tortfeasor employer (especially private 
employers).  This principle does not make employees liable for torts of 
their employers or of other employees, and the principle does not apply 
to employees individually.43 
To understand vicarious liability, it is necessary to define the roles 
of both the relevant employer and the employee in the scope of 
employment. The term master signifies an employer, while either the 
terms of agent or servant define an employee. An agent has the freedom 
to sign contracts or to sell products for their employer and the employer 
can be liable for their agents’ contracts with others.44 However, the 
employer is not liable for an agent’s tortious actions.45   Alternatively, 
an agent can be known as an electronic agent,46 the designation of 
which can be easily applied to a drone. Employees who perform 
physical tasks are called servants.47   
Additionally, independent contractors exist as a distinct subset of 
employee. 48  Independent contractors differ from servants or agents 
because the master is not ordinarily vicariously liable for the 
independent contractor’s torts.49 However, the master is liable for the 
                                                          
41 Master-Servant Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
42 Melin-Schilling v. Imm, 149 Wash. App. 588 (2009). 
43 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545 (Ala. 2006)). 
44 See Ware v. Timmons, 954 So. 2d 545 (Ala. 2006). 
45 Carman v. Wieland, 406 S.W.3d 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) 
46 Electronic Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
47 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 
48 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing See, e.g., Patterson v. T.L. Wallace Construction, 
Inc., 133 So.3d 325 (Miss. 2013)). 
49 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing Patterson v. T.L. Wallace Construction Constr., 
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torts of their servants when the servants commit a tort within their 
scope of employment.50  No matter how humanlike or humanoid a 
drone may seem, courts should exercise caution before calling a drone 
an agent, employee, or servant, because the drone’s master controller 
or master is in control of its pre-determined actions. 
It may be difficult for courts to understand the proper imputation 
of blame in a drone-related incident.  In such cases, it is vital to consider 
the person of the master controller, who acts as the drone’s service 
provider or programmer and who can override the drone operator’s 
commands.   From the master controller’s perspective as the defendant, 
vicarious liability will mean strict liability because the drone should be 
without fault.51  However, confusion may remain as to whether fault 
lies with the drone, the master controller, the drone operator, the 
manufacturer, or with the designer.  Should the plaintiff argue a 
negligence standard, he or she must first prove that the drone 
committed a tort 52  and that it was acting within its scope of 
employment.53 In such instances, the fault could fall upon the drone’s 
master controller, who might have irresponsibly provided a drone 
operator with an unsafe drone 54  or trusted in a reckless drone 
operator.55  In such scenarios, vicarious liability does not apply56 and 
the master controller is liable for their own negligent entrustment or 
their own negligent supervising.57 
Respondeat superior liability should apply to drones.  Respondeat 
superior encompasses the master’s negligent acts, even if the master 
did not command the drone to perform those tasks and could not 
foresee those acts in any specific way. 
                                                          
Inc. 133 So. 3d 325 (Miss. 2013)). 
50 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 (1) (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
51 Instructions to Jury No. 5-9, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12, 
2017); Verdict Form, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017) 
(finding the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment); SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 12A.06.050 
(2018). 
52 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing e.g., Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. 
Wuerth, 122 Ohio St. 3d 594 (2009)). 
53 RESTATEMENT SECOND AGENCY § 229, ILL. 1 (AM. L. INST. 1959). 
54 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557 (Tenn. 2005)). 
55 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.05(1) (2006)). 
56 Instructions to Jury No. 5-9, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 12, 
2017); Verdict Form, City of Seattle v. Skinner, No. 610377 (Seattle Mun. Ct., Jan. 13, 2017) 
(finding the defendant guilty of reckless endangerment); SEATTLE MUN. CODE § 12A.06.050 
(2018). 
57 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.1 (citing e.g., MV Transp. v. Allgeier, 433 S.W.3d 324 (Ky. 
2014)). 
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1. Respondeat Superior Liability 
In examining the efficacy of respondeat superior for drones, we 
find that the master controller or drone operator must be held to a strict 
liability standard. The law as a basic premise attempts to hold 
individuals accountable for their wrongs, but the involvement of a 
drone complicates such attempts because a drone cannot evaluate an 
action as a “wrong” on its own. Usually courts defend the imputation 
of strict liability if either: (1) an innocent person, either the plaintiff or 
the employer, must bear the loss,58 (2) the employer had formal right 
of control over the employee’s work,59 or (3) the employer benefits 
from the employee’s work.60  The first consideration of accountability 
has been applied selectively by courts; however, in a drone case, this 
principle could be crucial to determining the rightful bearer of liability 
and so should not be overlooked. Through the accountability principle, 
courts may determine the proper responsibility of control to fall upon 
the likely beneficiary of the activity. The employer is the likely 
beneficiary and must therefore bear the liability of the burdens their 
actions have caused.  Even though control is questionable in most 
cases, drones have a direct connection to a master controller or several 
masters to receive instructional inputs; therefore, the employee’s tort 
and the master controller’s benefit are an insufficient argument. 
Employers, or future drone master controllers, are likely to 
discourage employees from assuming responsibility for conducted 
drone activity so as to avoid their own liability.  If an employee takes 
responsibility under enterprise liability, and strict liability is applied to 
the operation, then businesses may perceive the risk as worthwhile in 
balance with the economic benefits that drone operations bring to the 
company.61  However, if strict liability were imposed upon businesses, 
a reasonable business model would necessitate more careful 
consideration of safety precautions.  On the other hand, a business can 
subsidize enterprise liability by raising or lowering dividends for use 
as insurance for losses caused by injury. 62  If a business were to 
implement such subsidization, that policy would result in a spread of 
losses to benefit those involved in the business’s activities. 63  The 
                                                          
58 Id. (citing South Carolina Ins. Co. v. James C. Greene & Co., 290 S.C. 171 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1986)). 
59 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.01, 7.07(2) (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
60 Id. (citing Mary M. v, City of Los Angeles, 54 Cal. 3d 202 (1991)). 
61 Id. (citing Alan Q. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984)). 
62  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The 
Revitalization of Harardous Acitivity of Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257 (1987). 
63 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise 
Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 
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application of strict liability to businesses ensures that no one 
individual has to bear the whole loss resulting from their injury.64  As 
a result, the consumer of the business’s product may pay a higher 
compensation cost to the injured employee.65  
Drone manufacturers and suppliers may try to argue that they 
should escape liability in certain circumstances, based on various legal 
standards of liability for the actions of an employee whose use of a 
drone caused personal injury.  Courts have found that it is unfair and 
inappropriate to hold manufacturers and suppliers liable for the actions 
of an employee who disregarded their instructions, failed to behave 
according to their training, or who suffered from an undisclosed 
emotional defect.66  Arguments that manufacturers and suppliers of a 
drone should not be held liable because an injury resulted from the 
drone disobeying its commands are inappropriate because the real issue 
in determining liability should focus on identifying the commands 
given to the drone. Once the injury-relevant command has been 
identified, strict liability applies. Various courts have found the 
application of the enterprise liability doctrine to respondeat superior 
liability to be rational. 67 Based on courts' consideration, it would be 
logical for a court to apply this doctrine to drone liability whenever a 
master controller as an employer is involved. 
2. Unmasking the Apparent Agent 
Apparent agency68  becomes a complex tort law issue when a 
master controller or master obtains a leased drone and creates an 
illusion that the drone is acting on behalf of their business as their 
servant or slave.69  For example, if an employee of Company X deals 
with the drone and is led to believe that the drone is owned by the 
company for which they work, then under apparent agency, the 
employee who is interacting with the drone should be entitled to hold 
their employer vicariously liable if they suffer injury from that drone.70  
This illusion created by the employer leaves the injured employee open 
                                                          
461, 447–83 (1985)). 
64  DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The 
Revitalization of Hazardous Activity of Strict Liability, 65 N.C. L. Rev. 257 (1987). 
65 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133 (Alaska 1972)). 
66 See Williams v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 1999). 
67 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.2 (citing e.g., Carter v. Reynolds, 175 N.J. 402, (2003)). 
68 Apparent Agent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
69 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (2006). 
70 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 429 (1965); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267 (1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 
(2006)). 
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to liability for the drone.71  If the drone is acting within its scope of 
duty, then the injured employee should be able to hold the employer 
vicariously responsible.  In addition, the employer should also be held 
responsible for the drone which is acting on its behalf. If the employer 
fails to properly identify the drone, the employee can reasonably 
believe that the drone is acting under the rightful scope of employment 
and is thus appearing as the drone of the employer.72 
Let us visualize the following scenario: a person’s home requires 
bug extermination. The exterminator comes to the individual’s house 
with a drone.  The drone wears a decal on its body that claims the drone 
is from the exterminating company, Company T. The employee from 
Company T uses the drone to gas the house.  However, as the drone is 
releasing the gas inside the house, it knocks over a few antiques and 
grazes the inside of the house, leaving gashes in the walls.  The 
homeowner sues Company T, only to later find out that the drone was 
leased from another company, Company E.  In this scenario, Company 
T is subject to liability, not Company E.  Company T has created the 
illusion that the drone is theirs and the drone acted as an agent for 
Company T; therefore, it can indeed be proper for the homeowner to 
think that the drone is an agent of Company T.73 
The issue of drone ownership, when decided solely based on 
appearance, may create difficulties where an estoppel-asserter 74 
plaintiff needs to prove the apparent agent is related to the defendant. 
75 On the matter of recovery for an estoppel-asserter upon whom harm 
has been inflicted, courts have been divided between Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 267 and Restatement (Third) of Torts § 429, 
which both require reliance on the plaintiff or recovery without 
reliance.76   Under the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 267, the 
estoppel’s representation 77  would likely need to prove that the 
employer or master created the illusion of the drone acting as their 
servant or slave.  On the other hand, Restatement (Third) of Torts § 429 
only requires the plaintiff to have accepted that those services were 
handled by the defendant.  In both cases, the estoppel-asserter 
reasonably believes the services were performed by the defendant.  
Therefore, we can conclude that the defendant, who had the drone as 
                                                          
71 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006). 
72 Id. (citing Wilkins v. Marshalltown Medical & Surgical Ctr., 758 N.W.2d 232 (Iowa 2008)). 
73 Id. (citing Independent Fire Ins. Co. v. Able Moving & Storage Co., 650 So.2d 750 (La. 1995)). 
74 Estoppel-Asserter, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
75 DOBBS, HAYEN & BUBLICK, The Law of Torts § 433 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.). 
76 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (See Fletcher v. South Peninsula Hosp., 71 P.3d 833 
(Alaska 2003)). 
77 Estoppel by Representation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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their servant or slave, deliberately created and then presented that 
illusion. The estoppel by representation cannot recover until that belief 
has been proved.78 
Apparent authority requires no reliance at all, but only a belief that 
the appearance of a drone gives it traceable authority79 to act on behalf 
of the defendant’s control and ownership.  Agency by estoppel requires 
the business to have fostered an intentional or negligent belief that the 
drone is their agent or have otherwise failed to correct that 
misapprehension.80 Courts have applied reliance standards based on 
the severity of the scenario, ranging from food services to medical 
services of the apparent agent.81  Courts determine if a business has 
created an illusion of the drone acting as its agent on a case by case 
basis.  If the drone causes injury or damage, the estoppel-asserter, as a 
consumer of the services, will likely have displayed sufficient reliance 
upon the business’s name brand. 
C. Proposed Master – “Slave” Rule 
“Master” and “slave” are common computer terminologies used 
by technicians to separate the main device (the master) and the 
dependent device (the slave or its slaves).  The dilemma of the drone 
acting as a slave comes into question when one master, a drone 
operator, or a mainframe82, remotely controls a drone as a part of their 
task to do work for another.  Imagine the following scenario: Company 
E leases drones to Company Z and provides Company Z with a drone.  
If the drone negligently causes injury to others, the question then arises 
whether vicarious liability should fall upon Company E as the drone’s 
controlling master, upon Company Z as the special employer, or upon 
both. 
In a personal employment scenario, courts would use a control 
test. 83  Thus, short-term cooperation agreements in personal 
employment scenarios cannot be compared to a drone, which functions 
as a borrowed employee.84  Assuming that the controlling master, as 
the general employer, retains control over the drone, a judge would 
likely conclude that the general employer is vicariously liable for the 
                                                          
78 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.7 (citing Baptist Memorial Hosp. System v. Sampson, 969 
S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998)). 
79 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
80 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.05 (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
81 Id. (citing See Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4 (2001)). 
82 Mainframe, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018). 
83 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. 
L. INST. 1959); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. f (AM. L. INST. 2006)). 
84 Borrowed Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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drone’s tort because it acted as a borrowed employee.  Alternatively, if 
the drone operator, as the special employer, has direct control to 
command the drone’s conduct, then the drone operator is the temporary 
master and the drone operator has become vicariously liable. If a 
mainframe is involved, then it necessarily follows that a hierarchy of 
control has been established. Under this hierarchy, the drone operator 
has now become the temporary master and ultimate control of the drone 
resides with the drone’s master controller rather than with the drone’s 
temporary master. Because the controlling master was not controlling 
the drone in this scenario, and the last instance of control over the drone 
was exercised by the drone operator, the controlling master is unlikely 
to be held liable under the respondeat superior doctrine. 
Although the drone operator may have control over multiple 
drones, the master controller will likely retain control over some 
command inputs of the drone; the relevant principle states that liability 
for an act follows control, wherever control lies.  Furthermore, some 
judges conclude that the true definition of control lies in the given tasks 
being performed (this is defined as the properties, purpose, and the 
tasks undertaken to finish the work).85 The idea of control does not 
correlate perfectly to liability. Under the master-slave rule, the idea of 
control does not necessarily equate to liability.  However, judges may 
use details of the controlled technical actions in imputing control, based 
on which party provided equipment to the master controller or to the 
drone operator.  Furthermore, the master controller may retain some 
control or interact with the drone at the same time as the drone operator 
can have control over some performed tasks, so control can be 
undeterminable in many tort cases. In order to apply the notion of 
control to cases, courts ultimately evaluate the control elements of a 
task based on appropriate or fair outcomes, none of which are directly 
related to control or to the technical aspects of the circumstances.  The 
judge is left to pass judgment on the issue of slave ownership, in spite 
of the judge’s lack of technical knowledge. This can easily lead to 
conflicting technical conclusions or even to a judicial disaster. 
The appropriate standard for assessing the liability of designers, 
manufacturers, sellers, lessors, and operators of “drones that have 
caused injuries to others” is provided by strict liability.  The basic 
principle of negligence law is that the defendant can escape liability as 
long as they had exercised “due care” in the activity alleged to have 
injured the plaintiff.  “Due care” means that the defendant has acted 
                                                          
85 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing New York Cent. R. Co. v. Northern Indiana Public 
Service Co., 140 Ind. App. 79, 221 N.E.2d 442 (1966); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 
227, cmt. a (1959)). 
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reasonably,86  in light of existing know-how and the capabilities of 
existing technology.87  Therefore, the negligence standard operates as 
a rule of liability based on industry standards, which are in turn based 
on the best practices of skilled practitioners.  For example, courts have 
looked to negligence when assessing liability for a remotely-controlled 
surgery that results in serious harm.  If the surgeon in question has used 
the best available techniques suitable for the type of operation, then it 
would be unfair and unproductive to impose liability on them, as they 
will have exercised “due care”. On the other hand, where a surgeon has 
performed their task without exercising “due care”, courts have felt that 
the surgeon should bear liability for the patient’s injury.88 
Currently, the only alternative to negligence doctrine has been the 
doctrine of strict liability.  This principle recognizes that some kinds of 
activity and technology are inherently dangerous and cannot be 
operated safely.  In these circumstances, courts and legislators have 
found some product-related injuries to be worthy of compensation by 
the designer, manufacturer, seller, lessor, or operator, even if these 
individuals had made the products as safe as possible.  This approach 
gives the appropriate incentive to those who are in the best position to 
insure against liability or to seek ways to make the product safer.  For 
example, the absolute liability standard has been used to determine an 
owner’s liability in instances in which the owner’s dangerous animals 
have escaped their care.89 It has also governed the proper storage or 
operation of explosives, and has helped inform guidelines for the 
prescription of new medicines that cause serious harm. In each 
example, the application of strict liability provides strong protection in 
the form of the above-described incentive. 
In instances of uncertainty or disputed outcomes involving 
control, it seems rationally apparent that there are few judges who 
would find both the master controller and the drone operator as being 
equally liable.  By holding both employers equally liable as master 
controllers, courts would be biased towards the merits of the disputed 
dilemma. This is justified because the operator might not have had 
complete control over the drone’s actions, if the operator’s commands 
were overridden by a service provider or by the device’s programming.  
For example, imagine another scenario in which a drone belonging to 
                                                          
86 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 10.8. 
87 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing La. Rev. Stat. § 9:22800.59; Neb. Rev. Stat. 
§25-21, 182). 
88 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing e.g., Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 
2009); Starcher v. Byrne, 687 S.2d 737 (Miss. 1997); Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 
1994)). 
89 See Irvine v. Rare Feline Breeding Ctr., Inc., 685 N.E.2d 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
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Company E is leased out to Company Z to dig a trench.  At Company 
E’s direction, the drone digs the trench to a dangerous depth.  The 
trench collapses and a Company Z employee, who was hired to lay 
fiber optic lines for the trench, is injured and sues. From the injured 
person’s point of view, the employee can maximize the compensation 
if: (1) the person can claim workers’ compensation from their 
employer, Company Z, and (2) if the person can sue Company E for 
tort damages.  If both Company Z and Company E are found to be 
masters of the drone which excavated the ditch, the injured person 
should be able to assert both of the claims.  However, Company Z 
might find this solution less-than-attractive because Company E may 
claim that damages occurred to its drone while it had been excavating 
the trench for Company Z.  If both Company E and Company Z are 
masters, then Company Z will incur worker’s compensation benefits 
and Company E will incur the cost of damages to their drone. 
Therefore, Company Z would be liable in tort under the worker’s 
compensation rule. In addition, this would be an exclusive remedy for 
covering the injuries of both employee and drone.  If Company E is 
found negligent, the effect of treating both employer and drone as 
masters in this setting is that Company E should not be immune for the 
drone in tort. 
Let us next imagine a medical malpractice scenario—where a 
drone leased or owned by a hospital assists an independent surgeon in 
an operation and negligently harms the patient. Judges would conclude, 
based on such facts, that the skilled surgeon, or drone operator, or 
mainframe as the master controller, is the captain-of-the ship90 and 
temporarily had the right to control the drone’s work. Under the 
captain-of-the-ship doctrine, the surgeon would be liable for the actions 
of assistants who are under the surgeon’s control but who are 
employees of the hospital, and not the surgeon.  As such, the surgeon 
should be held liable for the negligence of the assisting drones. The 
hospital would not be liable at all, because its drone has become the 
surgeon’s borrowed employee (i.e., the surgeon’s slave). 
Without considering technical facts, the captain-of-the ship 
doctrine attributes the status of master controller to the surgeon as a 
matter of tort law. The situation provides a stricter standard than that 
of the borrowed employee doctrine. Under the borrowed employee 
doctrine, the status of the surgeon as potential master controller poses 
questions of facts to be determined on a case-by-case basis, paying 
                                                          
90 Captain-of-the-Ship Doctrine, “In medical-malpractice law, the doctrine imposing liability on 
a surgeon for the actions of assistants who are under the surgeon’s control but who are employees 
of the hospital, not the surgeon.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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particular attention to manufacturing defects.  In the past, judges have 
rejected the doctrine and held the surgeon liable, but they have also left 
room for ordinary applications of the rule: if the surgeon has control of 
the drone in the operating room, then the surgeon is vicariously liable.  
If future judges find a surgeon liable for the actions of a drone, the tort 
would fall under the category of a non-delegable duty.91 The doctrine 
of non-delegable duty examines whether the decision was based upon 
special duties92  undertaken by those who care for helpless persons 
rather than upon control.  Accordingly, the courts might try to apply 
non-delegable duty to the surgeon, but this cannot legally be done 
under the doctrine of strict liability. If future judges apply non-
delegable duties as a matter of policy, then the law would be cleared of 
such captain-of-the-ship terminology. 
The following scenario provides a sound demonstration of the 
suitable application of strict liability to drone-related cases in which 
captain-of-the-ship terminology plays a complicating role.  Previously, 
hospitals had the protection of charitable immunities, under which 
hospitals could not be held liable or sued for their employees’ 
negligence, which practice signaled that non-delegable duties that were 
seen as uncompelling.93  These past hospital immunities have strongly 
concluded these matters in the form of damage caps.94  In addition, 
medical doctors and hospitals are in a position to contract for indemnity 
of the surgeon in such cases; as such, a non-delegable duty is not 
without some purpose to the plaintiff where it is recognized as such or 
imposed under the captain-of-the-ship doctrine.95 
II. DRONE DEFECTS UNDER PRODUCT LIABILITY 
A. Proposed Drone Product Liability 
At the intersection between drone technology and product 
liability, there are four main theories: (1) strict liability in product 
defects, (2) breach of warranty, 96  (3) misrepresentation, 97  and (4) 
                                                          
91 Nondelegable Duty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
92 Special Duties Doctrine, “The rule that a government entity (such as a state municipality) can 
be held liable for an individual plaintiff’s injury when the entity owed a duty to the plaintiff but 
not to the general public.  This is an exception to the public-duty doctrine.  The special-duty 
doctrine applies only when the plaintiff has reasonably relied on the governmental entity’s 
assumption of the duty.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
93 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 31.8 (citing e.g., Nazar v. Branham, 291 S.W.3d 599 (Ky. 
2009); Starcher v. Byrne, 687 S.2d 737 (Miss. 1997); Harris v. Miller, 438 S.E.2d 731 (N.C. 
1994)). 
94 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 23.3 (citing Lewis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 627 
N.W.2d 484 (Wis.2001)). 
95 Id. 
96 Breach of Warranty, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
97 Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
82 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 35 
negligence. 98   With regard to the application of the strict liability 
standard to drones, judges should observe the theories of 
misrepresentation and negligence on the part of drone operators, drone 
manufacturers, and drone distributors.  It seems most suitable that strict 
liability should be applied to drones due to the frequency of daily 
interactions between humans and artificial intelligence. 
The Restatement of Product Liability offers some insight on the 
issue of product liability as applied to drone technology. Specifically, 
the Restatement99 provides a test for determining strict liability for 
defective products. Under Section 402A, manufacturers and 
distributors are not categorically liable for all harm caused by their 
defective products. The plaintiff must prove under litigation that: (a) 
the defendant was in the business of selling products, (b) he sold or 
otherwise supplied the product in question, (c) the product was 
expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial change, (d) 
the product was defective when it left the defendant’s hands, and (e) 
the product’s defect was a factual cause of physical harm to the plaintiff 
and (f) a proximate cause as well.100   
Because manufacturers and distributors are held strictly liable for 
defective products, drone manufacturers and distributors may alleviate 
the pressures of this liability by spreading their losses across their 
business through insurance and by increasing prices. 101  If the 
manufacturer is aware that a certain quality standard exists and he or 
she ignores this standard or otherwise breaks it, then they are liable in 
the court’s eyes. However, this strategy of imposing strict liability 
tends to raise costs for the consumer, due to the manufacturer or 
distributor anticipating lawsuits resulting from potential injury. 102  
Therefore, those drone manufacturers or distributors enter the market 
with cheaper materials which people perceive as being safer. This 
position is perceived as weighing risks and utilities as the “cheapest 
cost avoider.” 103  Generally, drone operators, drone designers, and 
drone manufacturers would prefer contracts to escape liability for a 
drone. In alignment with the fairness rationale, consumers of drone 
                                                          
98 David G. Owen, Products Liability Law § 2.1 (2d ed. 2008). 
99 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.1 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998)). 
100 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
101 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2) (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 402A(1), (2)(b) & (c) (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
103 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward 
a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055 (1972) (“An arbitrary initial bearer of 
accident costs would (in the absence of transaction and information costs find it most worthwhile 
to ‘bribe’ in order to obtain that modification of behavior which would lessen accident costs 
most.”)). 
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technology are likely to rely heavily on the manufacturer’s 
representation of their non-hazardous and non-high-risk drone 
technology and will thus be under the impression that the 
manufacturer’s product is safe to use.104 
Taken altogether, while various theories of liability currently exist 
for drones, the Restatement’s defective liability and 402A principles 
make it clear as to which liabilities are likely worth consideration. 
Specifically, the Restatement deciphers strict liability by highlighting 
manufacturing defects as well as negligence or other similar tests for 
design and warning defects.105 Within the last several decades, courts 
have followed the comments of the older Second Restatement of Torts 
§ 402A without referencing the newer Restatements for strict liability 
approaches.106 However, the Third Restatement better addresses issues 
in determining product liability outside of strict liability and 
negligence.107 The Third Restatement adds that the risk of harm to 
operators through defects must be foreseeable by the design and 
warnings. 108  Most courts apply strict liability to cases involving 
manufacturing defects, yet leave negligence principles to design and 
warnings claims. 109  Let us imagine that a drone stops functioning 
according to its pre-programmed purposes or suffers some sort of 
debilitating internal damage. The plaintiff has experienced economic 
loss in accordance with the Restatement definition; however, no 
physical harm has been inflicted on a person or on another piece of 
property.110 The only harm was on the drone itself.  In this scenario, the 
only recourse a plaintiff could claim is a breach of warranty or 
contract.111  However, the plaintiff will have no claim on a defective 
drone if the statute of limitations has expired under contract or if the 
contract excludes or limits the liability of the drone,112 thereby enabling 
                                                          
104 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the 
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099, 1123 (1960)). 
105 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
106 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.2 (citing Fuchsgruber v. Custom Accessories, Inc., 628 
N.W.2d 833 (Wis. 2001)). A hydraulic jack handle broke, and plaintiff sued the manufacture, 
distributor, and seller after they were injured.  There can be little room for courts to make changes 
themselves for there are a few states statues that embed the Restatement Second Torts § 402A 
language). 
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 2(1) (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
108 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.4 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY §§ 1, 2(b) & (c) (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. L. INST. 1965); See DOBBS ET AL., supra 
note 25, § 33.8. 
110 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 7 (AM. L. INST. 1998). 
111 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248 
(1995)). 
112 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.4 (citing Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9 (1965)). 
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the economic loss rule.113  Note that physical harm or injury to a person 
under the economic loss rule does not bar that person from tort recovery 
for economic losses.114  
The same principle applies if a defective drone causes damage 
under the other-property rule.115  If a defective drone explodes by itself, 
the economic loss rule would govern the claim and the owner would be 
required to sue based on warranty.116  However, if the defective drone 
exploded adjacent to a building, then the building’s owner could claim 
damages to the building, because the building falls under the other-
property rule – which states that a tort recovery is unavailable if the 
only damage caused by a product defect is to the product itself.117  
Additionally, if a virtual bot, which is considered a drone under the 
proposed definition, were to physically or electronically destroy 
computer-encrypted data through malicious or defective virtualized 
commands, this computer data would not be considered by the courts 
to be intangible property and the economic loss rule would also apply 
to the owner of the computer-encrypted data118. Therefore, the drone’s 
master controller or designer would be held strictly liable for physical 
damages or harm to the computer-encrypted data.119  A similar strict 
liability standard can be applied to cases in which an algorithm-as-
computer-program is involved. According to the current law, drones 
that are algorithm-based cannot be considered tangible. Consequently, 
if a drone were to contain an algorithmic-based intelligence and the 
algorithm ceases to function as a virtual bot, then one could not sue for 
economic loss because the drone could not be considered tangible 
property.120  
                                                          
113 Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
114 See Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2000). 
115 Other-Property Rule, “The principle that a tort recovery is unavailable if the only damage 
caused by a product defect is to the product itself.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); 
See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. e (1998)). 
116 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248 
(1995)). 
117 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.3 (citing e.g., A.J. Decoster Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. 
Corp., 634 A.2d 1330 (Md. 1994). 
118 Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 2003) (“As stored on 
a hard drive, data consists of the arrangement “of hundreds of thousands of atoms” of “cobalt, 
iron, and other magnetic materials” in a perceivable and unique pattern. The data consists of small 
electromagnets in certain alignments. Once data is stored in a cell of a hard drive, that cell is 
physically different from a cell without data, and the physical differences between the two cells 
can be detected through the use of certain tools. Data stored on a hard drive is visible with the use 
of a microscope.”). 
119  Am. Family Ins. Co. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 1:10-cv-01124-JMS-DML, 2011 WL 
4550155 (S.D. Ind. 2011)). 
120 Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 89, 94 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
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B. Proposed Manufacturing and Design Defects Liability 
Consumers should not only rely on overly-simplistic methods to 
determine a breach in warranty or a violation of strict liability. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A has long been the foundation of 
the consumer-contemplation test — a  method of imposing product 
liability on a manufacturer if the evidence shows that a product’s 
danger is greater than that which a reasonable consumer expects.121  
Under this test, a drone would likely be found to be defective if it placed 
the seller into an unreasonably dangerous condition that would not be 
obvious to the sophisticated user.122  Examples of such an unreasonably 
dangerous condition would include a drone that was supposed to be 
weatherproof, but had exposed wires or a drone programmed with the 
wrong set of protocols and performed a task not originally intended by 
the drone’s designer.  However, the customer-contemplation test could 
help many courts to determine if a manufacturer’s product 
representation appears to be worth the consumers’ time when 
entertaining a purchase.123  When a plaintiff discovers hidden product 
flaws, the consumer-contemplation test would favor the plaintiff under 
the strict liability standard.124  For instance, if a consumer wanted to 
buy a flying drone but instead found that the flying drone came with a 
sharp metal shard molded into the plastic of the flyer’s body, each party 
to this case would likely recognize that molded plastic components 
should not contain sharp metal shards.  Therefore, even if the 
manufacturer did not discover this inconsistency, both parties would 
likely recognize that liability would fall upon the manufacturer.125  
Courts have often used a risk-utility test in place of the consumer-
contemplation test to determine a breach in warranty126 or violation of 
strict tort liability theories.127  Some courts have given the plaintiff the 
choice of using the risk-utility test to help in determining consumer 
expectations when the consumer-contemplation test itself does not 
                                                          
computer data, software and systems were not “tangible” property, under policy provisions 
covering liability for property damage). 
121 Consumer-Contemplation Test, “A method of imposing product liability on a manufacturer if 
the evidence shows that a product’s danger is greater than that which a reasonable consumer 
would expect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
122 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A. 
cmt. g (AM. L. INST. 1965)). 
123 Id. (citing Marshall S. Shapo, The Law of Products Liability § 1.02 and passim (4d ed. 2002)). 
124 Id. (citing Cf. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BURBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 462 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.)). 
125 See id. 
126 Id. (citing Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 663 N.E.2d 730639730 (N.Y. 1995)). 
127 Id. (citing Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1997)). 
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prove the product’s defect.128  A plaintiff who brings a suit against a 
manufacturer for manufacturing defects does not need to prove that the 
manufacturer, the designer, or the distributor was negligent.129  Thus, 
if a plaintiff was hurt by a defective drone, he or she need only show 
(1) that the drone was defective at the time when the drone left the 
defendant’s possession, (2) that it was expected that the drone reached 
the consumer without change, and (3) the consumer received the drone 
under the belief that the device would not have likely caused them 
harm.  The plaintiff can prove that the defect has caused the product to 
differ from its intended design.130  A plaintiff can also prove that a 
defect exists by showing that the drone malfunctioned or that the 
product was improperly made.  However, the mere existence of a defect 
does not suffice to establish liability where a deviation from the norm 
has not resulted in any product malfunction.131   
Under the doctrine of strict liability, if a plaintiff provides direct 
evidence that his or her drone is defective, then the courts may resort 
to the use of circumstantial evidence. 132  No standard rule of law 
currently exists for providing evidence applicable to drone defects in 
cases against all manufacturers, designers, or distributor of drones.  
Each case of malfunctioning drones has focused on the relevant 
individual defect, specifically upon either the defect’s apparentness or 
the lack thereof. 133  Courts have largely agreed that if a drone is 
compliant with industry standards, it is unlikely to be negatively 
affected by its environment and should not display any signs of 
defects.134  
This assumption, regarding drone compliance with industry 
standards, extends to the causation of harm principle. Consider a 
situation in which a drone not only exploded but the explosion also 
caused the plaintiff to lose an eye.135 It would be more appropriate for 
the courts to apply the consumer-contemplation test to cases involving 
                                                          
128 See id. (citing DeLaney v. Deere and Co., 999 P.2d 930 (Kan. 2000)). 
129 Id. 
130  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1998)); 
DOBBS ET AL., supra note 25, § 33.7 (citing Casey v. Toyota Motor Engineering & Mfg. North 
America, Inc. 770 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. 2014)). 
131 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.7 (citing Burley v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equipment, Inc. 
737 N.W.2d 397 (S.D. 2007)). 
132 Circumstantial Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
133 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.7 (citing Christopher H. Hall, Annotation, Strict Products 
Liability: Product Malfunction or Occurrence of Accident as Evidence of Defect, 65 A.L.R. 4th 
356 (1989)). 
134 See id. (citing Parsons v. Ford Motor Co., 85 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App. 2002)). 
135 Styers v. Winston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 80 S.E.2d 253 (1954). 
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manufacturing defects rather than upon design defect scenarios. 136 
Many difficulties arise from applying the consumer-contemplation test 
to design defect cases.137 In a scientific or technical case, for example, 
the consumer-contemplation test might be too vague.138  Furthermore, 
the consumer-contemplation test might prove challenging to the 
understanding and abilities of jurors who have no experience with a 
new type of drone. The new drone’s defects might be apparent to a 
discerning judge, but if evidence exists which indicates that consumers 
could not anticipate the severity of harm that could result from these 
defects, a pronouncement of liability would likely follow. The 
consumer-contemplation test could also create bias within a jury based 
on a drone’s appearance. For example, if a drone looks harmless or if 
a drone looks dangerously menacing in spite of its safety features.  
Without a demonstration of a drone’s capabilities (likely conducted by 
one or more technical witnesses), a jury would not know if the drone 
in question could cause harm. While courts sometimes perceive the 
average consumer’s ignorance of the existence of a potentially safer 
design as a good reason for denying liability, such reasoning is not 
rightfully applicable to matters of drone liability.139  When determining 
if a defect in a drone actually existed, the obvious dangers of a design 
defect is a primary factor. Therefore, the consumer-contemplation test 
is almost always applied in such cases.140  
Courts could use many tests when contemplating the attribution 
or exclusion of liability to a dangerous drone.  For example, courts have 
applied the risk-utility test to design defects, especially when the 
plaintiff alleges the existence of a design defect rather than a 
manufacturing flaw.141  To prove that a design is defective, a court may 
also include the risk-utility test as one part of a two-part test (with the 
consumer-contemplation test forming the second part) or as only one 
of a series of tests which the product needs to fail in order to qualify as 
defective.142  These tests have been integrated into statutes143 and into 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts for Product Liability.144 However, 
most courts have used the risk-utility test because it is simple to apply; 
                                                          
136 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 
137 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 
138 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing e.g., Morson v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App.4th 
755 (2001)). 
139 Id. (citing Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420 (Tex. 1997)). 
140 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6 
141 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.9 (citing Ray v. BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996)). 
142 Id. (citing Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. 1999)). 
143 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-6 (b)). 
144 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmts. a & f (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998)). 
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it easily allows reasonable people to decipher the evidence, and it not 
only determines negligence but also the defect’s magnitude. 145  In 
administering the risk utility test, courts have looked to seven factors: 
(1) the usefulness and desirability of said product, (2) the probability 
and magnitude of possible injury, (3) alternative available known 
substitutes, (4) the manufacturer’s ability to remove the unsafe 
character, (5) the user’s ability to avoid the dangers of the product, (6) 
the extent to which the user can be reasonably aware of the danger, and 
(7) the ability of the manufacturer to spread the loss. 146  The 
Restatement of Products Liability puts the burden of proof on the 
plaintiff to show that the manufacturer or designer could have 
minimized the dangers of the product by implementing alternative 
designs.147 
After the court has used the risk-utility test to impute strict liability 
for product flaws or manufacturing defects, ordinary negligence 148 
liability generally applies.149  While a court might use several rules in 
determining a liability case, the negligence liability of the design will 
likely remain.150  The unknown manufacturing risks in a design could 
mean the difference between an ordinary negligence case or a liability 
case for a design flaw.151  Although a few states have integrated one or 
more of these rules into their statutes, the higher courts ultimately use 
the risk-utility test when determining and applying ordinary negligence 
to design defects.152 
C. Proposed Defective Warning Liability  
As discussed above, if a defect does not cause physical harm but 
causes economic harm153  to a person or property, then courts will 
usually dismiss tort litigation pertaining to strict liability, negligence,154 
and fraud. 155   Accordingly, a drone manufacturer, designer, or 
distributor must not only provide the risks of a defective design flaw or 
                                                          
145 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.6 & 33.8 
146 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing Jon W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Lability 
for Products, 44 MISS. L. REV. 825, 837 (1973)). 
147 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
148 Ordinary Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
149 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.9 
150 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.12 & 33.17  
151 Id. (citing 2 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BURBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 
462 (2d ed. 2011 & Supp.)). 
152 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.12. 
153 Economic-Loss Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
154 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.3 (citing Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Strict Products Liability: 
Recovery for Damage to Product Alone, 72 A.L.R. 4th 12 (1989)). 
155 Id. (citing Digicorp, Inc. v. Ameritech Corp., 662 N.W.2d 652 (Wis. 2003)). 
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defective manufacturing errors, but also reasonable warnings about the 
foreseeable risk of harm caused by their products.156 Drones can be 
dangerous, so drone operators should be able to make informed 
decisions based on the warnings that can come with a specific drone.  
Although dangerous drones are built for specific tasks, the danger can 
be minimized by issuing a warning which reduces the magnitude of the 
risk or injury to the drone’s master controller or operator by influencing 
them to use better safety tactics.  A drone operator can act as a drone’s 
master controller by identifying and fixing the same sort of problems 
as those typically addressed by the master controller, even if they never 
purchased the drone themselves. Therefore, courts expect a warning to 
the operator to avoid finding strict liability.157 
However, not all warnings may stimulate better safety practices.  
Warning signs posted in a drone’s area of productivity will likely fail 
to protect all employees or passersby given the vagaries of human 
nature (exhaustion and lack of attention are especially common 
culprits). 158  While drone manufacturers could incorporate an 
inexpensive sensor into the drone, the drone could become mistakenly 
defective in lieu of this design addition.159  If a drone manufacturer, 
distributor, or designer foresees that a safety mechanism is not 
practical, then a proper warning can achieve safety for the operator.160  
For example, a drone operator or master controller could use gloves to 
prevent the electricity from a remote controller from shocking the 
drone operator.  The drone’s remote controller is not defective in this 
manner and the drone operator or master controller was able to shield 
themselves with very little effort and without having to sacrifice 
practical functionality.  
Warning defect claims are considered, alongside ordinary 
negligence and design defect cases, under the risk-utility analysis.161 
Some courts have held that, because manufacturers can provide 
                                                          
156 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998); Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 1997); 
Powers v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 174 P.3d 777 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007).)).  The materials supplied with 
Taser was described as “less-lethal” weapon in which the Taser been (1) tested on animals with 
no findings of having no effect on heart rhythms, and (2) deployed on more than 3000 persons 
with no long-term effects. However, the materials supplied with the Taser warned of short-term 
injuries from a fall could occur, noting most significant injuries to date had been “cuts, bruises 
and abrasions.”  Arizona Hindsight Test was applied, due to shock, an officer in training, 
compression fracture to their spinal disc. 
157 See id. (citing Patch v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 361 Mont. 241, 257 P.3d 383 (Mont. 2011)). 
158 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 33.6 & 33.8. 
159 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.6. 
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) § 2(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
161 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (PRODUCTS LIABILITY) §§ 2(i)(b), (i)(c) & (k) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1998); Risk-Utility Analysis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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warnings through media or other engraving techniques on their product 
with little cost, even a remote warning about the risks should be found 
somewhere on the product. 162  However, others have argued that 
verbose warnings overburden the product user and hinder the user’s 
knowledge of the product by discouraging a full reading of the 
warning.163  In most cases, a court will require a decision to be rendered 
in order for the court to determine the accuracy of a warning. 164  
Excessive details in a warning label do not mean that the warning has 
improved, nor should these details be meant to mislead the user about 
the product’s characteristics.165 According to the Third Restatement of 
Torts § 2, if a manufacturer has not provided any warning that would 
be clearly decipherable by a reasonable person, then the warning is 
legally considered to be non-existent and can be assessed as such by a 
jury.166  
It is difficult to determine the known risks of a product, especially 
with new technologies such as drones. A drone may not require a 
warning because the attendant risks are commonly known,167 obvious 
to the drone operator or to the drone’s owner, or if the warning has been 
otherwise conveyed through the chain of distribution.168  This is vastly 
different from a design problem.169  If a drone manufacturer produces 
two drones, only one of which is safe to use, and makes those dangers 
known, the manufacturer does not have to provide separate warnings 
for each drone.170  However, if another drone is cheaply made and 
dangerous, the drone manufacturer’s choice does not provide him or 
her with immunity because the drone’s danger is apparent and 
obviously defective.171 Only on simple products is there no duty to 
provide warnings about obvious dangers.172   
                                                          
162 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing Ross Labs. Div. of Abbott Labs. v. Thies, 725 
P.2d 1076 (Alaska 1986)). 
163 Id. (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976)). 
164 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.14 (citing e.g., Koruba v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 935 A.2d 
787 (N.J. App. Div. 2007)). 
165 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.14 (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 
652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981); See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 9.3 (2d ed. 2008)). 
166 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing see, e.g., Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 
749 (Mo. 2011)). 
167 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing e.g., In re Prempro Prods Liab. Litig., 514 
F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2008); cf. Carrier v. City of Amite, 50 So. 3d 1247 (La. 2010)). 
168 See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806 (Ind. 2007)). 
169 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13. 
170 Id. (citing cf. Carrier v. City of Amite, 50 So. 3d 1247 (La. 2010)). 
171 See discussion supra Section II.B. for more details on producing defective drones.   
172 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13 (citing Mills v. Giant of Md., LLC, 508 F.3d 11 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007)). 
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The central question of strict liability and its proper applicability 
to drones concerns whether a jury, comprised of reasonable people, can 
decipher obvious dangers. 173  Courts seem to believe that rational 
thinkers are able to figure out dangers and that the risks are a matter of 
law. 174  This approach will relieve drone manufacturers and drone 
designers of their warning obligations. Warnings would serve the 
master controller or the drone operator by providing a safer alternative 
to the obvious danger.175  For example, manufacturers could provide a 
simple engraved statement about the dangers of the drone technology, 
accompanied with supplementary material providing an in-depth 
explanation of the dangers posed by the drone’s capabilities.  Warnings 
must clearly communicate their message, in factual content that the 
drone operator or master controller can understand.176 The warning 
could be as simple as: “Do not fly drone without propeller guards.”  For 
a recreational flying drone, the warning would notify the flying drone 
operator or master controller that this drone can be dangerous, and this 
perception does not negate the need for the warning.177   
Individuals dealing with drones should also evaluate whether the 
learned-intermediary doctrine can be applied to drone operators and 
master controllers. Under the learned-intermediary doctrine, drone 
manufacturers have an obligation to warn or must warn appropriate 
healthcare professionals who operate medical drones of the substantial 
dangers posed by their drone.178  If the surgeon, who is acting as the 
master controller of the medical drone, fails to inform the patient about 
future risks, the patient can sue the surgeon, but not the drone 
manufacturer.179  The learned-intermediary doctrine is a rule of law, 
and not a mere balancing act of risks and utility tests applied by a 
court. 180   This doctrine is applied to any medical devices, body 
implants, and drugs that are customarily issued alongside medical 
advice and supervision.181 
Furthermore, when considering the learned-intermediary 
doctrine, a special danger exists when drone manufacturers or 
                                                          
173 Id. (citing e.g., Keogh v. W.R. Grasle, Inc., 816 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1991)). 
174 Id. (citing Sollami v. Eaton, 772 N.E.2d 215 (Ill. 2002)). 
175 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.13. 
176 See id. 
177 Id. (citing Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
178 See Sparks v. Mena, 294 S.W.3d 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 25, § 
33.15 (citing e.g.., Simon v. Wyeth Pharm., Inc., 989 A.2d 356 (Pa. Super. 2009)). 
179 See id. (citing Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35 (Ill. 2002). 
180 Id. (citing Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging 
the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185 
(1996)). 
181 See id. (citing Craft v. Peebles, 893 P.2d 138 (Haw. 1995)). 
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distributors regularly sell drones to master controllers.182 This same 
danger is also present when drone operators work with a specific drone 
that is designed to perform a certain task. 183  Typically, master 
controllers or drone operators of drones which are bought for a specific 
task will foresee the dangers posed by these drones, while others who 
are unfamiliar with those specific drones may not be as 
knowledgeable.184  Manufacturers, distributors, and designers should 
not omit warnings on these devices altogether based on an assumption 
that sophisticated master controllers or drone operators are tech savvy 
enough to understand the dangers that the drone could poses to an 
unsuspecting passerby or the operator.  After all, courts have not 
always applied the learned-intermediary rule because their analysis of 
each individual case differs.185  In making a warning claim, the plaintiff 
must prove that more clear or reasonable warnings were needed to 
prevent injury. 186  Thus, no superseding causes can insulate the 
defendant from liability for their drone. Yet, this is different than 
product defect cases.187  Before allowing a warning claim to move 
forward, courts will first determine if a plaintiff has read and followed 
all the warnings supplied with the drone; thus, the plaintiff must prove 
that no warning was provided. 188   The same principle applies to 
defendants, manufacturers, designers, and distributors of drones if they 
failed to warn intermediaries of the inadequacies of a proper warning 
and led sophisticated users to rely on their own knowledge or to pass 
up on the warning.189 The plaintiff’s inference or presumption about 
the warnings and dangers of said drone warnings would signal to a jury 
that a factual cause issue is at hand; otherwise, the evidence would 
show that the plaintiff did not take the proper precautions described in 
the warning supplied by the manufacturer, distributor, or seller of the 
drone.190  If the plaintiff failed to read the content-inadequate warning, 
                                                          
182 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15. 
183 Payne v. ABB Flexible Automation, Inc., 116 F.3d 480, ___ (8th Cir. 1997). 
184 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15 (citing See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank and Trust Corp. v. Am. 
Eurocopter Corp., 378 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
185 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.15 (citing Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829 (Conn. 
2001) (distinguishing the learned-intermediary rule and the sophisticated users rule)). 
186 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16. 
187 See discussion supra Section II.B.; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing e.g. Riley v. 
American Honda Motor Co., 856 P.2d 196 (Mont. 1993)). 
188 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing East Penn. Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 
1113, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
189 Id. (citing Coffman v. Keene Corp., 628 A.2d 710 (N.J. 1993)). see discussion supra Section 
I.C. 
190 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Fanham v. Bombardier, Inc., 640 A.2d 47 
(Vt. 1997)). 
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their claim can then be rebutted by the evidence that, their co-workers 
or employer could have understood it and therefore would have 
adequately advised the plaintiff of the drone’s dangers.191 However, if 
a warning is inadequately displayed, then the plaintiff’s burden in this 
scenario would be to point out that, if the warning had been adequately 
displayed, then it would have caught the plaintiff’s attention, thereby 
allowing them to avoid the danger altogether.192  Where courts have 
accepted this scenario, they have generally applied the presumption in 
the same manner as in cases where no warning existed.193 
Drone designers, drone manufacturers, and drone distributors 
seeking to counter-argue that the plaintiff did not read the provided 
warnings could attempt to prove that the plaintiff would have ignored 
the warning’s advice if they had read it.194  In these types of cases, the 
plaintiff must prove that even if a warning had been present, it would 
not have adequately reminded them about the foreseeable dangers of 
the drone’s actions. 195 This chain of arguments would lead the court to 
believe that the plaintiff’s actions were in keeping with those of a 
reasonable person, so the courts would likely issue a verdict ruling a 
warning on the drone would have made no difference at all upon the 
plaintiff’s circumstances.196  By the same token, if the proper warning 
was ineffective due to the plaintiff’s lack of awareness about the 
foreseeable harms, a failure to warn would not therefore be the factual 
cause of harm and the plaintiff could not recover.197 
Where superseding causes have insulated a defendant from 
liability for a failure to warn, the plaintiff’s injury must have been 
sustained within the proximate cause that the warning was meant to 
avoid. 198  Consider the following scenario: a plaintiff should be 
properly warned that operating a drone coated in hazardous chemicals 
could cause them to develop cancer via exposure to the prolonged 
radiation emitted by these chemicals. Even if the plaintiff’s exposure 
to radiation could be limited through the use of protective gear, the 
plaintiff should still be informed about the hazards posed by the drone’s 
special coating. Failure to warn the plaintiff that the drone’s special 
                                                          
191 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.8 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
192 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 904 P.2d 
861 (Ariz. 1995); Idaho Code § 6-1305). 
193 Id. (citing East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113, 1124 (D.C. 1990)). 
194 Id. (citing Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck ＆ Co. 904 P.2d, 861 (Ariz. 1995)). 
195 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16. 
196 See id. (citing Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
197 See id. (citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 797 A.2d 138 (N.J. 2002)). 
198 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 15.16. 
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coating would expose the plaintiff to radiation and could result in 
liability if the plaintiff developed an injury.199  Similarly, if the plaintiff 
broke her leg while working with the drone and kept their job in a 
machine-related accident, then the master controller would not be 
liable for failure to warn.200 Factual cause for failure to warn would be 
applicable in that scenario, though this assumes that the plaintiff would 
have taken the necessary precautions or found an alternative way to 
work with the drone.201 The drone operator’s physical injury, suffered 
at the drone’s hands, is not within the risk that the warning on the drone 
was designed to avoid.  Although the drone operator was not notified 
about the drone’s special coating, courts are likely to hold that there 
should be adequate warnings for additional foreseeable causes.202 
III. SCALING DOWN DRONE LIABILITY 
A. Proposed Reduction of Strict Liability 
Strict liability could be allocable in certain drone tort cases; 
however, this is not a constant rule. The Second Restatement gives 
courts guidelines for determining uncertainty if a claim is considered 
abnormally dangerous.203 However, a common consensus on the best 
known practices of drone operation does not currently exist; as a result, 
it is unknown whether strict liability does in fact minimize risks. Drone 
operators, masters, or master controllers who perform tasks with the 
best known practices of proper technical operation, or who operate 
drones in an environment deemed safer, could reduce high-risk 
activities to reduce the possibility of harm and thus minimize strict 
liability.204  As such, it may be more beneficial to target those activities 
which entail pervasive risks, due to the lack of strict liability, rather 
than seek to limit the hazards posed by high-risk activities. Thus, 
because of the constantly-evolving nature of technology, the economic 
value of drone use may indeed be greater than the value of more 
                                                          
199 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Shelcusky v. Garjulio, 797 A.2d 138 (N.J. 
2002). 
200 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16. 
201 Id. 
202 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.16 (citing Eagle-Pincher Indus., Inc. v. Balbos, 604 
A.2d 445 (Md. 1992); In re Levaquin Products Liability Litigation, 700 F.3d 1161 (8th Cir. 
2012)). 
203 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 707 P.2d 2 (Mont. 
1985)). 
204 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.7 (citing Mark Geistfeld, Should Enterprise Liability 
Replace the Rule of Strict Liability for Abnormally Dangerous Activities?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 611 
(1998)). 
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traditional methods when carrying out high-risk tasks due to the logical 
difficulty of eliminating all potential risks.  
In the circumstance in which a plaintiff is participating in 
abnormally dangerous actions and a third-party intervenes and so 
causes the plaintiff to suffer an injury, the Third Restatement applies 
the ordinary scope-of-risk rule.205 This standard typically applies in 
cases where the dangers lead courts to impose strict liability upon the 
third party who triggered the injury.206 At a minimum, whenever the 
intervening actor is not guilty of causing injuries, the Second 
Restatement requires the perspective that the intervention of others is 
an invariable element of the risk inherent in abnormally dangerous 
actions.207  Whenever a particular action is less likely to result in injury 
given intervention by a third party, any relevant harm or injury should 
preferably be pin-pointed by case-by-case inquiries.208 
When determining the parameters of strict liability, however, 
courts typically prioritize the Second Restatement, which limits strict 
liability to such cases as the performance of an abnormally dangerous 
action 209 or the harboring of an animal which causes harm to others,210 
without giving the flexibility of ordinary contributory negligence as a 
defense. 211  In the event that a plaintiff was negligently unable to 
foresee the imminent danger, the logical conclusion would be that the 
plaintiff was not stopped from pursuing their desired course of action 
by their negligence.212 With regard to statutes213 that contribute to the 
Second Restatement, previous defendants have successfully claimed 
that the plaintiff took the risk upon herself214 or was responsible for 
contributory negligence by knowingly and unreasonably exposing 
herself to the dangers of injury in a strict liability situation.215 
Additionally, under the Third Restatement and the Second 
Restatement’s comparative responsibility principle, a plaintiff’s 
contributory negligence often provides the justifiable basis for a 
                                                          
205  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 29, cmt. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
206 Id. 
207 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 522 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
208 Id. (citing Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 117 Wash. 2d 1, 17 (1991)). 
209 DOBBS  ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977)). 
210 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 515 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
212 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Matkovic v. Shell Oil Co., 218 Mont. 156 (Mont. 
1985)). 
213 Id. (citing Donner v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 358 So.2d 21 (Fla. 1978)). 
214 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 523 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
215 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, 524 (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
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decrease in his or her chances of recovery. 216  No division exists 
between assumption of risk and comparative fault, which are 
independent from contributory negligence, and in turn, dependent upon 
the comparable reduction-of-damages rule. 217   Crucially however, 
strict liability is invalidated if the plaintiff looks to acquire an 
advantage of his own by signing a strict liability contract,218 and also 
in accordance with some kind of authority, in cases where the plaintiff 
participates in the strict-liability situation. 219  Generally, courts are 
unlikely to acknowledge strict liability under a Third Restatement 
analysis if the plaintiff could have decreased the associated risk of the 
action in question to a rationally acceptable amount by exercising 
reasonable care.220 Therefore, even if a plaintiff has caused personal 
injury to themselves through their own negligence, the Second and 
Third Restatements justify recovery by a plaintiff whose own unique 
strict liability action is not initially attached to the defendant’s 
negligence.221 
B. Known Intervention 
In drone-human interactions, courts may understand who or what 
had control over the risks of a claim by first ascertaining the hierarchy 
of the chain of command over the drone. This understanding would 
take into account the particulars of a drone case in which the dangers 
are not necessarily produced by the defendant’s decisions and/or 
actions.222  Despite the inherent flaws in a rule of law which almost 
always absolves negligent plaintiffs, the plaintiff is not negligent when 
they rely upon the apparent safety furnished by the actions of the 
defendant.223 Stopping by a zoo is never an act of negligence, any more 
so than would be a defendant’s operation of a zoo.  After all, the 
assumption of a dangerous animal’s possible escape is not 
automatically present if the zoo is well-maintained.   The plaintiff, with 
                                                          
216  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 25 (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
217  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 25, cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
218  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 24(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
219 Id. (citing Pullen v. West, 92 P.3d 584 (Kan. 2004)). 
220  Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20, cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2010)). 
221 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515, cmt. b 524, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 
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222 See id. 
223 See id. (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 
1705 (1992)). 
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knowledge of a potential but unlikely danger and who refuses to 
relocate or re-orient their property or organization, is not absolutely 
responsible in the event that an escape does occur.224  Regardless of 
whether the plaintiff is properly permitted to be in their present 
location, they do not become responsible by remaining there.225  In fact, 
the defendant might potentially have a duty to protect the plaintiff from 
their own negligence, in which scenario the plaintiff’s negligence is 
without defense.226 
Many rationales for industry standards exist in the absence of 
applicable government tests. 227  However, the courts could instead 
adjust the analysis to inquire whether the danger posed by the 
defendant’s activity arose under unique and unlikely circumstances. 
Likewise, the courts could also attempt to determine whether the 
danger was the product of an interaction with a plaintiff who possessed 
a selection of control over these risks.228 To a certain extent, the courts 
should limit these characterization conditions. Hence, a defendant 
whom the plaintiff failed to stress the comparable risks would be a good 
one-way risk candidate for strict liability. 
Where a plaintiff proves that a design characteristic triggers 
injuries, courts in a limited number of states have shifted the burden of 
justifying the design of a product to the defendant.229  In Baker v. Lull 
Engineering Co., the plaintiff was operating a heavily-loaded high-lift 
industrial-loader and ended up being injured by falling lumber. 230  
Upon examination, two of the loader’s design characteristics appeared 
to be defective.231 The court ruled that the plaintiff would be able to 
recover if the product qualified as defective under the standards of 
either the consumer expectations or the risk-utility tests.232 The risk-
utility test offered an additional advantage: if the plaintiff could prove 
that the product’s design characteristics caused his injury, then the 
defendant would be responsible for providing adequate justification for 
the design under the risk-utility approach.233 The Baker court required 
the defendant to prove that the design of their product could not have 
                                                          
224 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 515(2), 524(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977)). 
225 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing Leroy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul 
Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340 (1914)). 
226 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, §§ 16.2, 16.6. 
227 See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-1-63). 
228 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 32.9 (citing William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous 
Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1705 (1992)). 
229 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.12 (citing Baker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978)). 
230 Id. 
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232 Id. 
233 Id. (citing Pannu v. Land Rover North AmericaN. Am., Inc., 191 Cal. App.4th 1298 (2011)). 
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been altered to increase its safety at a reasonable cost.234  No such 
burden of proof was placed upon the plaintiff.  Strict liability and 
negligence235 require differing burdens of proof in cases where the 
courts use both the risk-utility test and the burden-shifting rule.236 Most 
courts to consider negligence have rejected this burden-shifting rule237 
in accordance with the Third Tort of Product Restatement.238 
A statutory adoption of the negligence standard would most likely 
have a substantive impact. Courts enforce the negligence standard by 
holding manufacturers liable for the known avoidable risks of a design 
defect.239  But a statute could limit a manufacturer’s negligence if their 
product met the state-of-the-art industry standard.240 Industry standards 
have been held as tests; however, the courts do not adopt industry 
standards as their own tests. Thus, some statutes foreclose liability for 
scientifically unknown risks.241  
There are two competing statutory approaches to the state-of-the-
art industry standard.242 One approach provides that the defendant is 
not liable for the product’s design and its method of manufacturing at 
the time of the state of the art standard.243 The other approach presumes 
the product to be non-defective if it conforms to either “generally 
recognized and prevailing standards” or to the state of the art 
standard.244 There is a disjunction that distinguishes state statutes from 
the state-of-the-art industry standards, which exculpates the product if 
either is established.245  Without the benefit of an interpretation or 
simple end results, these types of statutes do not necessarily suggest 
that the industry’s peculiar unique techniques could diminish the 
boundaries of the drone industry’s liability.  State-of-the-art statutes 
draw challenges regarding the burden of proof from time to time.246 
                                                          
234 Id. (citing Baker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413 (1978)). 
235 Id. (citing Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 245 Wis. 2d 772, 629 N.W.2d 727 (2001)). 
236 Id. (citing e.g. Ray v. Bic Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527 (Tenn. 1996)). 
237 Id. 
238 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§2(b), cmt. c, cmt. D, 
cmt. f (1998)). 
239 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; N.C. GEN STAT. § 
99B-1.1, 99B-4 & 99B-6; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)). 
240 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; N.C. GEN STAT. § 
99B-1.1, 99B-4 & 99B-6; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:58C-3; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.75(A)). 
241 Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-116-104). 
242 Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1)). 
243 Id. (citing e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683(1)). 
244 Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2)). 
245 Id. (citing KY. REV. STAT. § 411.310(2)). 
246 See id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-683; Mo. Stat. § 537.764(2); IOWA CODE § 668.12; LA. 
REV. STAT. § 9:2800.59; NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182). 
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Insofar that a statute does not guarantee admissibility of state-of-the-
art evidence without prescribing a substantive rule, it fails to specify a 
technique regarding the burden of proof.247  
Manufacturing defects, as distinguished from design and warning 
defects, serve as the basis for strict liability.248 This is because when a 
product’s risk is unknowable, its current design and warning claims can 
be essentially unsuccessful. 249  However, certain state-of-the-art 
statutes could potentially reduce the chances of strict liability 
allegations for various kinds of product defects. Many statutes 
minimize the state-of-the-art defense; however, it would be a 
misinterpretation to permit strict liability to play a role in allegations of 
manufacturing defects.250  The fact that a product’s design is state-of-
the-art, thus implying that the product could not likely be risk-free, 
does not correspondingly imply that the product’s ingenuity is state-of-
the-art as well.251 
IV. DEFINING DRONES 
A. Etymology of Drones 
There is some confusion about the legal term of drones in the 
minds of judges, lawmakers, and society as a whole.252  Therefore, we 
will discover the intended meaning of the term and will propose a 
uniform definition of the word drone.253  Historically, the term drone254 
was first used in relation to honey bees (Apis).255 Honey bees have 
three types of contributors in their society: queens, workers, and 
drones.256  The queen bee is perceived to be in complete control over 
her hive257 and she is surrounded by servants, or attendants, who feed 
her royal jelly.258 The queen releases pheromones, chemical signals, 
while also sending messages through “messenger bees”259 which can 
                                                          
247 Id. (citing Hughes v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 294 (Iowa 1994)). 
248 DOBBS ET AL., supra note 24, § 33.19. 
249 Id. (citing MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63). 
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251 Id. (citing Falada v. Trinity Industries Indus., Inc., 642 N.W.2d 247 (Iowa 2002)). 
252 Govan, supra note 1; Alben, supra note 1. 
253 See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
254 MARK L. WINSTON, THE BIOLOGY OF THE HONEY BEE 39–41 (1987). 
255 Id. at 6. 
256 THOMAS D. SEELEY, HONEYBEE DEMOCRACY 25 (2010). 
257 WINSTON, supra note 254, at 1. 
258 Id. at 71. 
259 WINSTON, supra note 254, at 147 (citing Thomas D. Seeley, Queen Substance Dispersal by 
Messenger Workers in Honeybee Colonies, 5 No. 4 Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 391-
415 (1979) (Thomas Seely proposed the term “messenger bees” for worker bees that exchange 
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act to control many of their behaviors. 260   Furthermore, numerous 
studies have verified that, although all workers strive for the survival 
of their queen, the queen is not all-knowing.261  Workers collectively 
perform endless and diverse tasks through self-governance including, 
dying from stinging a colony’s competing hive, tending to the brood, 
cleaning, and storing honey; 262  they rarely ever mate.263   Although 
biologists now understand that drones are designed to mate, 264 
originally drones were thought to simply be mindless honey bees, and 
no different than workers, who all followed orders from a centralized 
dictatorship: their queen.265   By the same token, honey bees are a 
collection of individuals which function as an integrated whole and are 
unmistakably social creatures.266 
In fact, honey bee swarms build a unanimous consensus (or, in 
rare cases, split) on certain decisions, such as when deciding on a new 
location for their hive, selecting richer nectar sources, or debating more 
efficient ways to strengthen the swarm.267 There are no representatives 
or bees with superior voting weight, including the queen herself. 
Eventually, during the debate process (epitomized by the more “noisy” 
visual stimulus)268 the minority loses its motivation and accepts the 
majority’s opinion.269  Interestingly, when a swarm makes a decision, 
                                                          
information though antennations, and pheromones that are distributed all over the queen’s body 
to transport messages throughout the colony.    These worker bees will exchange information with 
up to 56 other worker bees)).     
260 Id. at 147. 
261 SEELEY, supra note 256, at 5. 
262 WINSTON, supra note 254, at 3. 
263 Id. at 66. 
264 WINSTON, supra note 254, at 41 (citing Y. Lensky et al., Pheromonal activity and fine structure 
of mandibular glands of honey bee drones (Apis mellifera L.) (Inseta, Hymenoptera, Apidae), 31 
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265 Sarah Pleuthner, How Dominant is the Queen Bee?, AMERICAN HONEY BEE PROTECTION 
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266  SEELEY, supra note 256, at 25; Id. at 75 (citing Martin Lindauer, Schwarmbienen auf 
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mindlessly taking orders from the queen.); see Aimee S. Dunlap et al, Foraging Bumble Bees 
Weigh the Reliability of Personal and Social Information, 26 No. 9 CURRENT BIOLOGY at 1195, 
1195–1199 (2016); Id. at 228 (citing ROBERT. J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2000); 
RICHARD. H. THALER et al, NUDGE (2008)). 
267  SEELEY, supra note 256, at 118 (citing JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY 
DEMOCRACY (1983)). 
268 Id. at 200 (citing see Jeffrey D. Shaller, Neural basis of deciding, choosing, and acting, 2 
NATURE REVIEW NEUROSCIENCE, 33-42 (2001)). 
269 Id. at 137 (citing Martin Lindauer, Schwarmbienen auf Wohnungssuche, 37 ZEITSCHRIFT 
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only three to four percent of the bees actually know where to lead the 
other honey bees.270  This process allows the bees to avoid the risk of 
creating an information cascade by evaluating independently and 
coming to a unanimous consensus via the promotion of ideas through 
observation and communication.271 Thus, the parallels between honey 
bee drones and human-controlled, manufactured drones are both fitting 
and readily apparent.272 
The term “robot” 273  has numerous definitions. Although most 
individuals view robots as machines, robots in fact possess human-like 
capabilities, such as sensing their environment and reacting 
autonomously. 274  Thus, we can conclude that the proper legal 
definition of a robot does not need to conform to popular culture 
expectations. Although robots come in virtually infinite shapes, sizes, 
and purposes, they do not have to fit the role of a metallic humanoid 
which performs tasks for its masters. 
In 1935, U.S. Admiral William H. Standley saw a British 
demonstration of the Royal Navy’s new remote-control aircraft for 
target practice, the DH 82B Queen Bee. Once he returned stateside, 
Standley charged Commander Delmer Fahrney with developing 
something similar for the Navy.  Fahrney adopted the name ‘drone’ to 
refer to these aircraft in homage to the Queen Bee.  The term fit, as the 
drone could only function when controlled by an operator on the 
ground or in a “mother” plane.275 
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275 HOWETH, supra note 272, at 479-81 (citing Letter from Commander Aircraft Battle Force to 
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Adm. D. S. Fahrney (Mar. 9, 1953)). 
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A drone is a preprogrammed machine that carries out tasks with 
limiting degrees of human interaction. 276  From a third-party 
perspective, drones can be perceived as making decisions on their own.  
However, a true drone cannot make wholly independent decisions.277  
Most drones do not have a fundamental need for learning-algorithms 
or over abundant sensory inputs to carry out their tasks.  If a drone has 
sensory gear, such gear, benefits its master controller as an extension 
of itself. 278  A master controller is either a programmer, service 
provider, or even a piece of internal programming, all of which have 
the ability to override the operator. Paul J. Springer believes that the 
concept of autonomy means that a machine must be able to carry out a 
task independent of human intervention.279 Therefore, a drone would 
fail Springer’s autonomy test. 
FIGURE 1.  SCALING DRONE AUTONOMY280 
 
                                                          
276 See SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1111 fig. 44.2; See infra Figure 1. 
277 SICILIANO, ET. AL., supra note 5, at 308, 346. 
278 See id. at 718. 
279 SPRINGER, supra note 274, at 4. 
280  SICILIANO ET. AL., supra note 5, at 1111 (citing THOMAS B. SHERIDAN: TELEROBOTICS, 
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Unmanned aircrafts are the most recognized limited autonomous 
system in aviation.  Springer believes that a machine’s reaction timing 
and speed is greater than that of a human and so a significant 
percentage of UAV accidents are likely due to human error—for 
example, the pilot.281 A master controller has limited sensory input 
from the aircraft.282  With human input, an aircraft can choose its own 
flight path, estimate conflicting airspace, and select its own vectors for 
targeting or following vehicles on land, sea, or air.283  For the layman, 
when considering a drone’s capability to perform such actions, their 
minds immediately jump to the next logical question: if a drone is able 
to choose its flight path or select a targeting vector, then is it not simply 
a matter of time before a robot or a drone will decide for itself to take 
a human life?  In such an instance, who would have granted the drone 
the right to make that decision? 
In this regard, the presumption that artificial intelligence (“A.I.”) 
comes with a degree of freedom of choice raises the question of 
whether A.I.s will emulate human thinking.284  However, a machine 
must function independently without an operator to be truly 
autonomous.  To this extent, a “robotic” is known as a hybrid of a drone 
and of a robot.285  Robotics have a limited degree of decision-making 
abilities and interaction with their environment and are still under the 
command and control of a human operator.286 
Our current definition of A.I. requires the inability for a human to 
tell the difference between another human and the machine.287  Because 
A.I. does not suffer from fatigue or boredom, its decision-making 
capabilities are more predictable, as they are based on statistics rather 
than a response to emotions.288  A.I.s cannot at this time be creative 
problem-solvers; however, they can mimic solutions used by their 
programmers.289 
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Nevertheless, an autonomous device can malfunction, perhaps 
due to faulty programming, and go against its operator or master or 
cause errors.  Springer suggests that autonomous weapons should not 
be incorporated into robotics and drones, due to the fact that they are 
expendable, unlike humans.290  Drones can perform tasks that are too 
dangerous for humans to undertake. As Clarke famously stated, “any 
sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”291 
Clarke believed that, to the minds of a population unfamiliar with the 
function or development of a high-technology device, magic is a 
perfectly acceptable explanation for the presence and workings of said 
device.292 
Robots are commonly viewed as physical entities or a race of 
some kind that are controlled, pre-programmed, or self-reliant. 
However, many people hold the misconception that robots, and so 
drones as well, are necessarily metallized machines with a humanoid 
appearance. History reveals that the word “robot” was first used in a 
play, written by Karl Capek in 1921, called “R.U.R. (Rossum’s 
Universal Robots).”293  The play is about mechanical men who were 
built to work on factory assembly lines and eventually rebelled against 
their human masters.294  These mechanical men obtained their name 
from the Czech word for slave. 295  Additionally, in 1928, Alan H. 
Reffel, an engineer, coined the stereotypical robot characteristics from 
his creation, known as Eric Robot.296  Reffel’s depiction of Eric Robot 
started the classic Hollywood horror film portrayal of robots as having 
white bulbs painted red for eyes, stiff, motorized leg movements, a 
body made out of aluminum, and, lastly, an electronic voice which 
appears to be autonomous or otherwise directly under human 
control. 297   Altogether, these popular culture depictions have 
influenced the common perception of both robots and drones, most 
critically in a misleading or even confusing fashion.  
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Like drones, robots receive orders and take action based on a 
given set of commands from a central location or central processing 
unit.298  A robot is actually the physical shell with the appearance of a 
mechanical machine.  However, a robot cannot be identified as a drone 
under the proposed definition if the robot does have an autonomous 
machine-learning algorithm.299 
B. Proposed Uniform Definition of Drone 
State laws have interpreted an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to be a “drone.”300  However, this 
section describes what the nature of a drone should be in tort law. 
Drone generally means any algorithm that carries out an action 
following a command or commands.  This includes commands 
programmed in advance and real-time commands. 
Drone intelligence is an algorithm which can act in an intelligent 
fashion, as said algorithm is based on the intellects of the humans who 
constructed the algorithm.301  Therefore, a drone possesses a minimal 
artificial intelligence algorithm.  Per industry standard, the drone’s 
artificial intelligence algorithm can be simplified into two categories: 
commanded (controlled)302 and predetermined (list).303 A commanded 
(controlled) purpose is known as input from a central location or a 
controller.304  A drone’s artificial intelligence relies on a controller, or 
master, to give the drone a set of instructions.305  The best example to 
illustrate this reality is that of a radio-controlled car: whatever input is 
signaled to the car from the joystick, the robotic car will respond every 
time to these received signals. 
Predetermined artificial intelligence draws from a list of pre-
programmed commands.306 The artificial intelligence in question can 
have the appearance of predictability, randomness, strategy, or simple 
reactiveness to its surrounding environment, all as defined by the 
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programmer.  These types of intelligence have been viewed as either 
smart or illogical, depending on the outcome when said artificial 
intelligence interacts with a human’s judgment.307 
Regardless, drones are highly capable of causing serious bodily 
harm; therefore, robotic engineers and robotic scientists have proposed 
to adhere to Isaac Asimov’s three fundamental Rules of Robotics: 308 
1. A robot may not injure a human being or, through 
inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.  
2. A robot must obey the orders given it by human 
beings except where such orders would conflict with the 
First Law.   
3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as 
such protection does not conflict with the First or Second 
Laws.309 
Legal scholars argue that robots capable of causing serious bodily 
injury break the “strict” three laws of robotics developed by Asimov. 
310   However, although robotic experts have referred to Asimov’s 
science fiction works for their guidelines on robotics, such works detail 
concepts and devices that were merely imaginary at the time, but which 
are certainly no longer merely speculative.311 As such, Asimov’s rules 
for robots (defined as android autonomous artificial intelligence) 
should not apply to drone intelligence at all. Artificial intelligence 
engineers and scholars should not restrict the subject and rules of 
artificial intelligence to concepts found within Asimov’s science 
fiction. Courts should instead hold the master operator, master, 
designer, or manufacturer strictly liable for the actions of the drone in 
question.  The confines laid down by Asimov’s works are much too 
narrow to do proper justice to the highly complex and still evolving 
matter of drone technology.  
None of the above described robot laws are applicable to the 
current drone technology. Satya Nadella created Satya Nadella’s A.I. 
Laws312 and Mark W. Tilden presented Tilden’s “Laws of Robotics.”313 
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However, these new ideas are neither new nor groundbreaking and fail 
to help advance artificial intelligence law as it pertains to the issue of 
strict liability.  More fittingly, the Engineering and Physical Sciences 
Research Council (EPSRC) and the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council (AHRC) of Great Britain in 2011 published a set of five ethical 
“principles for designers, builders and users of robots”:  
1. Robots should not be designed solely or primarily to 
kill or harm humans. 
2. Humans, not robots, are responsible agents. Robots 
are tools designed to achieve human goals. 
3. Robots should be designed in ways that assure their 
safety and security. 
4. Robots are artifacts; they should not be designed to 
exploit vulnerable users by evoking an emotional 
response or dependency. It should always be possible 
to tell a robot from a human. 
5. It should always be possible to find out who is legally 
responsible for a robot.314 
These rough guidelines have been complied by multiple scholars, 
engineers, and theorists and have been increasingly fine-tuned, thus 
rendering them much more suitable for legal consideration than the 
currently relied-upon science fiction works. As mankind searches for 
emotional companionship, it will be quite complex to implement 
Robotic Law Number Four and the EPSRC and AHRC principles for 
designers, builders, and users of robots. These examples of robotic laws 
furnish an excellent starting point, but by no means do they comprise a 
gold standard of robotic law for legal scholars.315  
Currently, drones may or may not pass the Turing test, all without 
any relevant restrictions to the proposed drone definition.  The Turing 
test was designed to observe if a human subject would be able to 
evaluate the true identity of the entity with whom they were interacting: 
an actual human being or a computer chat bot.316 Its creator initially 
suggested that if the machine could convince a human of its own 
humanity after five minutes of conversation at least thirty percent of 
the time, 317  then the machine could be fairly said to have passed 
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Turing’s test. This test measures not the machine’s ability to correctly 
answer questions, but instead how closely the machine’s answers 
resemble those that an average human would give. 318  Therefore, a 
drone could pass the Turing test319 so long as it could convince a human 
subject of its human-like decision-making abilities. 
In the legal world, the term drone can also be used to identify 
humans who smuggle drugs, such as marijuana, in the employ of an 
illegal business.320  These human drones follow orders from their drug 
lords in an effort to provide an income for themselves and/or their 
families.321  As shown, lawmakers and politicians do not use a singular 
meaning when they seek to identify a drone.322 As the Seventh Circuit 
Judge Easterbrook wrote in one opinion, “[d]rones of the organization-
-the runners, mules, drivers, and lookouts--have nothing comparable to 
offer. They lack the contacts and trust necessary to set up big deals, and 
they know little information of value. Whatever tales they have to tell, 
their bosses will have related.”323  In this manner, it is clear that the 
term drone’s essential definition, regardless of its use or application, is 
related to either something or someone who unthinkingly takes 
commands.  
We also see the legal definition of drone being used imprecisely 
at the state level: 
Washington State’s definition of a “Drone” holds that the 
term “should apply to unmanned aerial vehicles 
controlled by a remote operator . . . [such as a]n unmanned 
aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct 
human intervention from within or on the aircraft”.324  By 
contrast, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) 
does not define Unmanned Aircraft Vehicles (“UAVs”) 
as “drones,” holding that “[u]nmanned aircraft means an 
aircraft operated without the possibility of direct human 
intervention from within or on the aircraft.” 325 As such, 
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the FAA definition is compatible with this Article’s 
proposed drone definition. 
CONCLUSION 
As legislators work to integrate the concept of artificial 
intelligence into the law, courts must determine the placement of the 
drone master, master controller, or operator in the hierarchy of drone 
liability. Drone generally means any algorithm that carries out an 
action following a command or commands.  This includes commands 
programmed in advance and real-time commands.  In drone liability 
cases where the agent is unclear, courts should rely on scientific 
knowledge to determine the actor who is at fault. The drone 
manufacturers, distributors, or designers should be held to a strict 
liability standard for any defects. This is proven to be the case in 
instances of physical harm caused by a drone in which the master 
controller, the master, or the operator has been held strictly liable.  
Bearing these recommendations, future courts will be significantly 
better equipped to evaluate cases of drone liability. 
